NOBEL GEOPOLITICS
Stratfor
By George Friedman
U.S. President Barack Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize last week. Alfred
Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, established the prize, which was to be
awarded to the person who has accomplished "the most or the best work
for fraternity among nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing
armies and for the promotion of peace congresses." The mechanism for
awarding the peace prize is very different from the other Nobel
categories. Academic bodies, such as the
Sciences, decide who wins the other prizes. Alfred Nobel's will stated,
however, that a committee of five selected by the Norwegian legislature,
or Storting, should award the peace prize.
The committee that awarded the peace price to Obama consists of chairman
Thorbjorn Jagland, president of the Storting and former Labor Party
prime minister and foreign minister of
former member of the Storting and president of the Conservative Party;
Sissel Marie Ronbeck, a former Social Democratic member of the Storting;
Inger-Marie Ytterhorn, a former member of the Storting and current
senior adviser to the Progress Party; and Agot Valle, a current member
of the Storting and spokeswoman on foreign affairs for the Socialist
Left Party.
The peace prize committee is therefore a committee of politicians, some
present members of parliament, some former members of parliament. Three
come from the left (Jagland, Ronbeck and Valle). Two come from the right
(Kullman and Ytterhorn). It is reasonable to say that the peace prize
committee faithfully reproduces the full spectrum of Norwegian politics.
A Frequently Startling Prize
Prize recipients frequently have proved startling. For example, the
first
received it in 1906 for helping negotiate peace between
American fears that an unbridled
the Pacific. He sought peace to ensure that
Russian power in the Pacific and not hold
other prizes of the Russo-Japanese War. To achieve this peace, he
implied that the
In brokering negotiations to try to block
victory over the Russians, Roosevelt was engaged in pure power politics.
The Japanese were in fact quite bitter at the American intervention.
(For their part, the Russians were preoccupied with domestic unrest.)
But a treaty emerged from the talks, and peace prevailed. Though
preserving a balance of power in the Pacific motivated
Nobel committee didn't seem to care. And given that Alfred Nobel didn't
provide much guidance about his intentions for the prize, choosing
Roosevelt was as reasonable as the choices for most Nobel Peace Prizes.
In recent years, the awards have gone to political dissidents the
committee approved of, such as the Dalai Lama and Lech Walesa, or people
supporting causes it agreed with, such as Al Gore. Others were
peacemakers in the Theodore Roosevelt mode, such as Le Duc Tho and Henry
Kissinger for working toward peace in Vietnam and Yasser Arafat and
Yitzhak Rabin for moving toward peace between the Israelis and
Palestinians.
Two things must be remembered about the Nobel Peace Prize. The first is
that Nobel was never clear about his intentions for it. The second is
his decision to have it awarded by politicians from -- and we hope the
Norwegians will accept our advance apologies -- a marginal country
relative to the international system. This is not meant as a criticism
of Norway, a country we have enjoyed in the past, but the Norwegians
sometimes have an idiosyncratic way of viewing the world.
Therefore, the award to Obama was neither more or less odd than some of
the previous awards made by five Norwegian politicians no one outside of
Norway had ever heard of. But his win does give us an opportunity to
consider an important question, namely, why Europeans generally think so
highly of Obama.
Obama and the Europeans
Let's begin by being careful with the term European. Eastern Europeans
and Russians -- all Europeans -- do not think very highly of him. The
British are reserved on the subject. But on the whole, other Europeans
west of the former Soviet satellites and south and east of the English
Channel think extremely well of him, and the Norwegians are reflecting
this admiration. It is important to understand why they do.
The Europeans experienced catastrophes during the 20th century. Two
world wars slaughtered generations of Europeans and shattered Europe's
economy. Just after the war, much of Europe maintained standards of
living not far above that of the Third World. In a sense, Europe lost
everything -- millions of lives, empires, even sovereignty as the United
States and the Soviet Union occupied and competed in Europe. The
catastrophe of the 20th century defines Europe, and what the Europeans
want to get away from.
The Cold War gave Europe the opportunity to recover economically, but
only in the context of occupation and the threat of war between the
Soviets and Americans. A half century of Soviet occupation seared
Eastern European souls. During that time, the rest of Europe lived in a
paradox of growing prosperity and the apparent imminence of another war.
The Europeans were not in control of whether the war would come, or
where or how it would be fought. There are therefore two Europes. One,
the Europe that was first occupied by Nazi Germany and then by the
Soviet Union still lives in the shadow of the dual catastrophes. The
other, larger Europe, lives in the shadow of the United States.
Between 1945 and 1991, Western Europe lived in a confrontation with the
Soviets. The Europeans lived in dread of Soviet occupation, and though
tempted, never capitulated to the Soviets. That meant that the Europeans
were forced to depend on the United States for their defense and
economic stability, and were therefore subject to America's will. How
the Americans and Russians viewed each other would determine whether war
would break out, not what the Europeans thought.
Every aggressive action by the United States, however trivial, was
magnified a hundredfold in European minds, as they considered fearfully
how the Soviets would respond. In fact, the Americans were much more
restrained during the Cold War than Europeans at the time thought.
Looking back, the U.S. position in Europe itself was quite passive. But
the European terror was that some action in the rest of the world --
Cuba, the Middle East, Vietnam -- would cause the Soviets to respond in
Europe, costing them everything they had built up.
In the European mind, the Americans prior to 1945 were liberators. After
1945 they were protectors, but protectors who could not be trusted to
avoid triggering another war through recklessness or carelessness. The
theme dominating European thinking about the United States was that the
Americans were too immature, too mercurial and too powerful to really be
trusted. From an American point of view, these were the same Europeans
who engaged in unparalleled savagery between 1914 and 1945 all on their
own, and the period after 1945 -- when the Americans dominated Europe --
was far more peaceful and prosperous than the previous period. But the
European conviction that the Europeans were the sophisticated statesmen
and prudent calculators while the Americans were unsophisticated and
imprudent did not require an empirical basis. It was built on another
reality, which was that Europe had lost everything, including real
control over its fate, and that trusting its protector to be cautious
was difficult.
The Europeans loathed many presidents, e.g., Lyndon Johnson, Richard
Nixon, Ronald Reagan. Jimmy Carter was not respected. Two were liked:
John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton. Kennedy relieved them of the burden of
Dwight D. Eisenhower and his dour Secretary of State John Foster Dulles,
who was deeply distrusted. Clinton was liked for interesting reasons,
and understanding this requires examining the post-Cold War era.
The United States and Europe After the Cold War
The year 1991 marked the end of the Cold War. For the first time since
1914, Europeans were prosperous, secure and recovering their
sovereignty. The United States wanted little from the Europeans,
something that delighted the Europeans. It was a rare historical moment
in which the alliance existed in some institutional sense, but not in
any major active form. The Balkans had to be dealt with, but those were
the Balkans -- not an area of major concern.
Europe could finally relax. Another world war would not erase its
prosperity, and they were free from active American domination. They
could shape their institutions, and they would. It was the perfect time
for them, one they thought would last forever.
For the United States, 9/11 changed all that. The Europeans had deep
sympathy for the United States post-Sept. 11, sympathy that was on the
whole genuine. But the Europeans also believed that former U.S
President George W. Bush had overreacted to the attacks, threatening to
unleash a reign of terror on them, engaging in unnecessary wars and
above all not consulting them. The last claim was not altogether true:
Bush frequently consulted the Europeans, but they frequently said no to
his administration's requests. The Europeans were appalled that Bush
continued his policies in spite of their objections; they felt they were
being dragged back into a Cold War-type situation for trivial reasons.
The Cold War revolved around Soviet domination of Europe. In the end,
whatever the risks, the Cold War was worth the risk and the pain of U.S.
domination. But to Europeans, the jihadist threat simply didn't require
the effort the United States was prepared to put into it. The United
States seemed unsophisticated and reckless, like cowboys.
The older European view of the United States re-emerged, as did the old
fear. Throughout the Cold War, the European fear was that a U.S.
miscalculation would drag the Europeans into another catastrophic war.
Bush's approach to the jihadist war terrified them and deepened their
resentment. Their hard-earned prosperity was in jeopardy again because
of the Americans, this time for what the Europeans saw as an
insufficient reason. The Americans were once again seen as overreacting,
Europe's greatest Cold War-era dread.
For Europe, prosperity had become an end in itself. It is ironic that
the Europeans regard the Americans as obsessed with money when it is the
Europeans who put economic considerations over all other things. But the
Europeans mean something different when they talk about money. For the
Europeans, money isn't about piling it higher and higher. Instead, money
is about security. Their economic goal is not to become wealthy but to
be comfortable. Today's Europeans value economic comfort above all other
considerations. After Sept. 11, the United States seemed willing to take
chances with the Europeans' comfortable economic condition that the
Europeans themselves didn't want to take. They loathed George W. Bush
for doing so.
Conversely, they love Obama because he took office promising to consult
with them. They understood this promise in two ways. One was that in
consulting the Europeans, Obama would give them veto power. Second, they
understood him as being a president like Kennedy, namely, as one
unwilling to take imprudent risks. How they remember Kennedy that way
given the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the coup against
Diem in Vietnam is hard to fathom, but of course, many Americans
remember him the same way. The Europeans compare Obama to an imaginary
Kennedy, but what they really think is that he is another Clinton.
Clinton was Clinton because of the times he lived in and not because of
his nature: The collapse of the Soviet Union created a peaceful
interregnum in which Clinton didn't need to make demands on Europe's
comfortable prosperity. George W. Bush lived in a different world, and
that caused him to resume taking risks and making demands.
Obama does not live in the 1990s. He is facing Afghanistan, Iran and a
range of other crisis up to and including a rising Russia that looks
uncannily similar to the old Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine
how he can face these risks without taking actions that will be counter
to the European wish to be allowed to remain comfortable, and worse,
without ignoring the European desire to avoid what they will see as
unreasonable U.S. demands. In fact, U.S.-German relations already are
not particularly good on Obama's watch. Obama has asked for troops in
Afghanistan and been turned down, and has continued to call for NATO
expansion, which the Germans don't want.
The Norwegian politicians gave their prize to Obama because they
believed that he would leave Europeans in their comfortable prosperity
without making unreasonable demands. That is their definition of peace,
and Obama seemed to promise that. The Norwegians on the prize committee
seem unaware of the course U.S.-German relations have taken, or of
Afghanistan and Iran. Alternatively, perhaps they believe Obama can
navigate those waters without resorting to war. In that case, it is
difficult to imagine what they make of the recent talks with Iran or
planning on Afghanistan.
The Norwegians awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the president of their
dreams, not the president who is dealing with Iran and Afghanistan.
Obama is not a free actor. He is trapped by the reality he has found
himself in, and that reality will push him far away from the Norwegian
fantasy. In the end, the United States is the United States -- and that
is Europe's nightmare, because the United States is not obsessed with
maintaining Europe's comfortable prosperity. The United States cannot
afford to be, and in the end, neither can President Obama, Nobel Peace
Prize or not.
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Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
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